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Sovereignty and the Regulation of International Business in the
Tax Area
H. David Rosenbloom*
It is a great pleasure to return here to Cleveland and to the Institute. I
always particularly enjoy conferences that deal with a variety of legal
areas, of which tax is but one, because I know I can safely start by
observing that whatever you have heard about other subjects over the
past day or so, and whatever you will hear for the next day or so, are
completely divorced from this area of law. Tax people live in their own
cocoon. I am going to try today to make some generalizations about the
issues we face, and their relationship to sovereignty, and I will try to
avoid being too technical.
There is a tremendous history of international cooperation in the
tax area - probably greater than in any other legal area. The current
rules and principles, which enjoy a remarkable level of international
agreement, trace back directly to work done by the League of Nations
in the 1920s. There are several modern institutions that have brought
these principles forward, among which the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development in Paris is preeminent. The OECD
Committee on Fiscal Affairs does a fine job of maintaining a high level
of international understanding in the tax area. So we have long-stand-
ing institutions. We have a long history of cooperation. We have many
unique things in the tax area that bear on today's topic.
On the other hand, the short-term outlook is for some fairly pain-
ful conflict, which is likely to mean dollars-and-cents cost to cross-bor-
der investment. I do not think anyone knows quite what to do about it.
Nor am I confident that anyone in a position to do anything is giving
sufficient thought to the potential for that conflict.
Let me explain. No area of law is closer to the subject of sover-
eignty than taxation. When the Soviet Union imploded several years
ago, and the world was faced with fifteen or so newly independent ju-
risdictions, one of the first manifestations on the world scene, if not in
the world press, was the development of fifteen new tax systems. There
still exists a state of considerable tax-related activity in many of those
countries, accompanied by tax treaty negotiations on an impressive
scale. And there is a great deal of international work being done in
support of these developments.
* Attorney specializing in international tax matters, Caplin & Drysdale. The following text
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Despite the worldwide consensus on the principles of international
taxation, it is fair to say that nations are quite reluctant to surrender
their autonomy in this area. Other legal areas could be cited, but feel-
ings seem to be more extreme in the tax area. Evidence for this state-
ment can be found in many quarters. For example, common law coun-
tries, such as both the United States and Canada, are unwilling to
enforce the tax judgments of other countries in their courts, even when
they stand prepared to enforce other kinds of judgments. In a modern,
interconnected world this unwillingness borders on the inexplicable.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has
been a godfather, if you will, to the development of a network of four
to five hundred tax treaties throughout the world, published in numer-
ous volumes by the International Bureau of Fiscal Development in Am-
sterdam. However, the OECD has been unsuccessful in translating
these bilateral agreements into anything resembling a multilateral
treaty. Although there is near unanimity at the level of principle, in
practice and administration it is virtually impossible to pass beyond the
bilateral level. I do not believe anyone knowledgeable about the tax
area would suggest that we are likely to see anything resembling
GATT or NAFTA ih this area any time soon. We are only barely able
to cope with the network of agreements that presently exist.
Most international tax conventions, commonly called tax treaties,
establish a dispute resolution mechanism, the Mutual Agreement Pro-
cedure. Some of us think that is the heart of a tax treaty, and that
everything else is just guidance on how particularized disputes should
be resolved. A taxpayer, of course, is concerned about how its case will
be concluded, not general principles. So the Mutual Agreement Proce-
dure is a very important aspect of the tax treaty network. Each tax
treaty has a provision defining the Mutual Agreement Procedure, by
which representatives of the two countries, the competent authorities,
are authorized to sort out disputes.
There has been considerable debate in recent years about whether
countries will accept an arbitration mechanism in the Mutual Agree-
ment Procedure. And there has been extreme reluctance on the part of
most countries, particularly the United States, to do that in a meaning-
ful way. There have been some small moves in the direction of arbitra-
tion in the recent U.S. treaties with the Netherlands and Germany but,
by and large, the United States (like most other countries) has insisted
on retaining its autonomy in the tax area.
As a final example of the degree to which countries insist upon
sovereignty in tax matters, I would point to the problems and issues
that have arisen within the United States, where states have invoked
their freedom under the Constitution to develop their own tax systems
virtually without constraints from the federal government. According to
my understanding, the same phenomenon is also found in Canada. In
[Vol. 20:267 1994
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fact, one of the things we were able to agree on in negotiating the U.S.-
Canada Tax Treaty was that neither country had an appetite for put-
ting constraints on its subnational jurisdictions.
So there is considerable evidence, I think, that tax and sovereignty
go hand in hand. At the same time, I do not have to remind this group
that developments in international commerce are placing unprece-
dented strains upon national tax systems, as well as the network of bi-
lateral tax agreements. And nowhere is that issue any sharper than in
the area generally referred to as "transfer pricing." Contrary to what
some have implied, transfer pricing is not an inherently evil thing. It is
not something we should wish to do away with, much less something
that we can do away with. Transfer pricing refers simply to the fact
that related parties transferring value, that is to say goods and services,
between them must set a price. The price they set is called the transfer
price. It is the price at which the value is transferred. There is nothing
objectionable about that and, in fact, transfer pricing is inevitable in a
world of separate legal entities under common control. However, there
has been a growing and very sharp focus in the last ten years or so on
testing the prices set by controlled parties against an objective stan-
dard. That is the heart of the current international tax conflict. It is not
the only manifestation of such conflict, but it is one good example of
where we may be headed for some real problems.
Most countries, of course, police the price at which their taxpayers
buy from or sell to related parties, and most countries of the world do
so with a view to preventing abuse. They take a fairly tolerant attitude
of the relationship between parties under common control. They will
step in to adjust prices, but only when things are badly out of harmony.
That has not, however, been the approach of the United States. Instead
of viewing transfer pricing as an area where rules are needed for the
purpose of preventing egregious practices, the United States has in-
creasingly taken the position that a set of rules can be developed that
will yield the "right" answer in any given case.
Perhaps I evince some slight professional bias in suggesting that
this tendency has been prompted by the economics profession, which
seems to believe that right answers are achievable in individual cases.
The result has been a stream of new rules in the United States that
increasingly define economic responses, economic approaches, to testing
transfer prices between related parties under the "arm's-length"
method.
Within the borders of the United States, the debate is not of any
practical importance because most related companies - and we are, of
course, talking mostly about corporate taxation here - file consoli-
dated returns. Therefore, within our borders the increasing sophistica-
tion of the transfer pricing rules has relatively little import, because
one company's deduction is another's income. It all washes out when a
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return is filed covering all companies in the affiliated group.
However, foreign related parties are not included in consolidated
tax returns. They appear in consolidated financial reporting, but not in
consolidated tax reporting. And so, transactions between related parties
that cross borders do implicate the transfer pricing rules, and it is pos-
sible, and in the view of some even common, for taxpayers to use trans-
fer pricing to shift income or deductions into or out of the United
States. It has been this concern, and the added concern that the United
States has lost revenues in recent years, that has led Congress to attack
the transfer pricing problem. This began with the 1986 Tax Act, but
gained strength and momentum in the late 1980s with a particular fo-
cus, it is fair to observe, on inbound investment from Japan.
There have been repeated hearings in Congress on this subject and
a great deal of rhetoric. Contributing to the problem is the very sub-
stantial delay in tax administration in the United States, by comparison
with other countries. In my own work, I am only just approaching the
mid-1980s in terms of the years under audit that are coming up for
review. The 1986 Tax Act was a very major piece of legislation, and I
have not yet begun a case involving 1987 or subsequent years. My sus-
picion is that Canada and most other countries are more current.
We also have an independent court system, but one that is heavily
document-oriented, in which litigation of a single case can easily take
three, four, five, or up to eight or even ten years. The cases are very
fact intensive, with warring experts on both sides fighting over the
proper transfer price for transactions that took place many years
previously.
We do not accord much discretion to our tax administrators in the
United States. And thus we have come to believe that, if we are going
to change anything, we must change the rules. The net effect, as I am
sure some of you know, is that we now have a two-volume Internal
Revenue Code and six volumes of regulations.
In sum, the transfer pricing area exhibits very detailed regulations
which have taken a highly sophisticated economic view of how to test
prices. In addition, we have placed upon taxpayers for the year 1994
and thereafter the burden, a new burden, of documenting their transfer
prices in advance so that, when they are examined, they will have to
show that their prices follow some methodology. This is opposed to de-
veloping a justification long after the fact when the examiner appears
on the doorstep.
All of this has given rise to international upheaval. The regulations
put out by the Treasury Department, first in proposed and then in tem-
porary and final form, have been the subject of review by the OECD,
which is writing its own report on transfer pricing. In addition, various
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Nor are these developments at the federal level the only pertinent
ones. You will recall that our states are substantially independent in
the tax field. While all of the above-described matters have been taking
place, there has been a simmering fifteen- or twenty-year controversy
involving a number of U.S. states, but principally California, on a re-
lated question. In the mid-1970s California despaired of the possibility
of testing transfer prices on an item-by-item arm's-length basis. To me
a lot of what they said makes sense. They said, first, it is too time
consuming. Second, testing on a transactional basis involves tremen-
dous resources. And the correct or "right" transfer price is inherently
unknowable. At what price would a controlled party have sold to an-
other controlled party if the parties had not been related? This is a
hypothetical question, an inherently unknowable kind of question, with
an unknowable approach to resolution, which invites very complex, very
fact-oriented controversies and has very little that is objective about it.
California threw up its hands as early as the 1970s and said, we
will not look at the transaction between the related parties. Instead, we
will determine how much income has been earned by the related par-
ties in the aggregate, and we will develop a formula to split that profit
between the related parties, a so-called formulary approach to transfer
pricing. On the merits, this has some appeal. Unfortunately, it has vir-
tually no appeal when the federal government is simultaneously taking
a transactional approach to the same issues.
This has caused much international consternation and produced a
raft of litigation, of which the most recent manifestation is the famous
Barclays case, just decided by the Supreme Court. The case had previ-
ously been decided against Barclays twice. The Supreme Court granted
discretionary review and has just decided against the taxpayer for a
third time.
Many people are talking about this subject, and it is highly contro-
versial; a lot of companies are concerned about it. However, I believe
the more immediate subject to be concerned about, in a conference on
sovereignty, is not the threat of formulary taxation but refinements of
the arm's-length method at the federal level. The increasing sophistica-
tion infusing the transactional method may not be proceeding in a de-
sirable direction.
Other countries have reacted adversely to U.S. transfer pricing de-
velopments. For example, Canada: On January 7, 1994 the Finance
Department and the Department of National Revenue issued a joint
news release endorsing the arm's-length method and referring to diffi-
culties that may arise when a jurisdiction adopts another method. They
focus primarily on the so-called comparable profits method, by which
profits of comparable companies are used to "back into," or impute, a
transfer price. The release said that if companies adopted the compara-
ble profits method to accord with the U.S. regulations, Canada would
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"not be able" to provide relief under the U.S.-Canada Income Tax
Treaty.
In recent weeks there have been reports that the Japanese have
taken a similar position. In addition, they have done something else
that had been widely predicted: They have begun assessing transfer
pricing adjustments against U.S. companies, the most recent of which
being an approximately $150 million assessment against Coca-Cola®.
It seems to me that all this debate and ferment are hidden from
the public to a large extent because the subject is highly technical. It
finds its way only occasionally into the press, for example when a politi-
cian says something foolish on a related subject. However, what seems
to be going on here is the building of an international tax conflict of
unprecedented dimensions.
The United States seems determined to follow its new, highly so-
phisticated rules. Canada and the other OECD countries seem deter-
mined not to give relief when adjustments using those rules are made.
And taxpayers, especially those operating across borders, are in the
middle. Given the attitudes borne of sovereignty considerations that na-
tions bring to the tax area, it is hard to predict where these develop-
ments will lead. Conceivably, if the new transfer pricing rules prove
impractical, or inadequate from the perspective of Congress, the world




Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 20 [1994], Iss. , Art. 30
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol20/iss/30
